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We investigate the balance between work (including home production), leisure and personal care (chieﬂy
sleep) within South African households. We use the South African time use survey which enables us to obtain
a better measure of the division of total labour (paid and unpaid) within South African households than
previous studies have been able to. Furthermore we construct a measure of “genetic” relatedness between
the respondent and other members of the household. We ﬁnd that women that are more closely related to
other household members do more work and enjoy less leisure than more peripheral individuals. Single men,
by contrast, seem to do less work and enjoy more leisure if they are more closely related to other household
members. Our ﬁndings are not compatible with the unitary model of the household. They suggest that men
extract extra leisure because of the anticipated altruism shown by women.
Keywords: altruism, genetic relatedness, Hamilton’s rule, intra-household allocation, rotten kid theorem,
time use
JEL codes: D13, D64, J22,
But the son, if he is wicked, will naturally avoid aiding his father, or not be zealous about it;
for most people wish to get beneﬁts, but avoid doing them, as a thing unproﬁtable. (Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, Book 8, Section 14.)
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Families and households have been the site of conﬂict about the distribution of “beneﬁts” and work since time
immemorial; this despite the fact that they are perhaps also the preeminent site of altruism and mutual care.
Indeed this is not only distinctive of human interactions. Trivers (1985, 1974, Ch.7) pointed out that parent-
oﬀspring conﬂict could be expected in animal interactions; on the other hand, altruism and mutual care in animals
are typically founded on close genetic relatedness and repeated interactions.
Analysing the balance between altruism and exploitative behaviour in human households is tricky, since
what may appear to outsiders as a lopsided distribution of “beneﬁts” within the household may actually be the
outcome of voluntary “gifts” of time and resources. It may be that members of the household “agree” that
resources should be so distributed. Indeed economists have traditionally tended to view households as being
united in their preferences over work and consumption choices (Becker 1991). This “unitary” model of the family
has come under attack in the last few decades (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, Chiappori
1988, Chiappori 1992, Chiappori 1997, Lundberg and Pollak 1994, Lundberg and Pollak 1996). (For a review of
the literature see Bergstrom 1996, Bergstrom 1997). The implication of the new “household bargaining” models is
that the distribution of work and beneﬁts will shift with who has power in the house. “Power” is usually thought
of in terms of the “outside options” of the household members concerned; individuals who would be better oﬀ if
the household dissolved would have a greater say in how the “beneﬁts” of the household are divided.
The Aristotelian idea that the division of beneﬁts and work may be a serious subject of enquiry is therefore
gaining ground, even among economists. Indeed there has been a call for the “burden of proof” to shift, from
the presumption of a unitary model to the collective one (Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinott and Kanbur
1995). The possibility of conﬂict in South African households has already attracted some attention. In a famous
paper Duﬂo (2003) has argued that pensions accruing to women are spent in diﬀerent ways from pensions accruing
to men. In a similar way, Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller (2003) have suggested that some South African men
become unemployed when social pensions are paid to the elderly (Bertrand et al. 2003). That study restricted its
attention to three-generation households, because the authors were concerned about heterogeneity in preferences
between diﬀerent types of households. Nevertheless one of the most striking “stylised facts” of South African
labour economics is how little work there is in these extended households. This raises a perennial question of
South African labour economics, whether there may be unrecorded types of activities in these households.
The data set most suitable for answering these questions is South Africa’s Time Use Survey, conducted in
2000. We provide more information on this survey below. A look at Table 1 will conﬁrm that there is not a lot of
primary production or informal service work captured in this survey either. Total eﬀo r to na n y t h i n gt h a tm i g h t
be considered “work” is around six and a half hours per day for prime age males. This contrasts with almost
ten hours devoted to sleeping, eating and personal hygiene. Indeed South Africans seem to do less work than
individuals in other low income countries (Budlender 2008).
The table also shows a marked gender division of labour with women doing roughly ﬁfty minutes more in all
2types of work and having ﬁfty minutes less of all types of leisure. Within these broad categories of time use there
are also pronounced diﬀerences, with women more specialised in home production and men more engaged in wage
work.
As (Alderman et al. 1995) point out, however, an unequal distribution of work and beneﬁts need not be a sign
of conﬂict in the household. For instance, it may be in everyone’s interest for the “breadwinner” to be given a
light domestic chore load if that will result in higher productivity at work. Nevertheless given that South Africa
has a high male unemployment rate, the fact that one is seeing so little evidence of other types of work gives one
pause for thought. It may also be the case that South African women prefer their men to be out “socialising with
nonfamily members”, but again this does not seem entirely plausible.
Of course the raw means reported in Table 1 are not all that informative, since we are not controlling for
anything. It may be the case that the men and the women are concentrated in diﬀerent types of households or
that some other characteristics account for these apparent diﬀerences. One objective of this paper is to explore
some of the dimensions along which work and leisure within the household are divided.
We will also be trying to assess to what extent it is plausible to assume that the observed distribution of
work and leisure is the result of common household preferences. Ideally we would need some exogenous price or
income variation, but that is hard to come by. Instead we will be focusing on a variable that we argue should
aﬀect only the relative “power” or altruism of the individual in the household but not any of the preferences or
costs associated with work and leisure. We show that there is considerable evidence that how closely related an
individual is to other members of the household will aﬀect how much work they do or how much leisure they are
able to enjoy. We show that there are some interesting gender asymmetries in the performance in this variable.
We argue that our ﬁndings suggest that there is indeed conﬂict about the division of beneﬁts and costs within
households. The importance of this variable is also suggestive of some of the biological underpinnings of human
social interactions (Cox 2007).
The plan of the article is as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy discuss some of the economic.theories of the
household. In the next section we deal with the South African literature that has had a bearing on intra-
household allocation issues. We then adapt a standard Chiappori style model to our purposes (section 4) and
discuss how we propose to estimate this in section 5. We turn to discuss our data set and how we construct our
variables in more detail in (6). Our empirical results are contained in section 7, we discuss them in section 8 and
conclude in section 9.
2 Economic theories of intra-household allocation
Traditional models of household allocation have assumed that the household maximises a single utility function
(for an overview of the literature see Ermisch 2003). An initial defence of this position was provided by Samuelson
(1956), although a more rigorous justiﬁcation was only provided much later, by Becker (1974, 1991). Becker’s
model relies on the actions of an altruistic household head to internalise, as it were, the conﬂicting preferences of
3household members. As long as the household head transfers resources to each household member, the household
behaves as though it maximises a single utility function - that of the altruist. Some of the limits of this defence
of the unitary household model were pointed out by Bergstrom (1989). He notes that Becker’s proof relies on the
existence of “conditional transferable utility”, i.e. that conditional on each set of choices the utility possibilities
frontier is a simplex. If the head of the household chooses the ﬁnal allocation on this frontier, then it is in the
interests of every member of the household (however rotten) to push the frontier as far out as possible. Bergstrom
notes that for a number of interesting applications of the theorem, it is also necessary that the head of the
household be able to precommit to a particular allocation strategy, otherwise it may be possible for particular
household members to restrict the choices available to the head of household. Such “lazy rotten kids” trade
on their parents’ altruism and reduce their work eﬀort in anticipation of the parents’ making good the income
short-fall. The outcome is ineﬃcient for the household as a whole, since it involves too low an eﬀort on the part
of the kids, but the kids are better oﬀ than in the eﬃcient equilibrium (Ermisch 2003, p.68).
The Becker model also relies on the fact that the head of the household distributes resources to every other
household member. As Manser and Brown (1980, p.32) note, this in fact presupposes that the resource allocation
issue has already been settled, because how else is the head free to distribute resources if he1 does not have
private rights to his money? Total household expenditure therefore reﬂects the preferences of the head of the
household because he has control over a suﬃciently large share of resources that he can eﬀectively determine the
ﬁnal allocations. If the altruist does not have large enough resources, however, then the ﬁnal allocations need not
reﬂect coherent preferences, even in a household of altruists (Stark 1995, Chapter 1).
Because the conditions under which the rotten kid theorem are applicable are restrictive, a number of authors
have explored alternatives. In a series of articles Chiappori and his co-authors (Chiappori 1988, Chiappori 1992,
Browning and Chiappori 1994, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene 1994) have advanced the case
that the model of the unitary household is ﬂawed in theory and probably not applicable in practice. Instead, they
posit that household allocations are eﬃcient, i.e. they are such that intra-household redistribution cannot lead
t oaP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t .W h i l et h e s ep apers are agnostic about the mechanism through which such allocations
are arrived at they show that the ﬁnal allocations can be viewed as deriving from a “sharing rule” in which total
income is allocated in the ﬁrst phase to diﬀerent members of the household and these members then in turn
purchase consumption items in the second phase. We sketch out this model in more detail below.
Manser and Brown (1980, p.32) and McElroy and Horney (1981) introduced the idea that the sharing rule is
derived from a bargaining process in which the “threat point” is given by the payoﬀ available to each member
when single. Manser and Brown’s presentation can best be interpreted as bargaining about the surplus generated
within the household prior to household formation. The model has, however, been viewed (including by its
authors) as bargaining about the sharing rule under the threat of divorce. As such it is held that changes in
1This pronoun is used advisedly. Although Becker’s model is theoretically neutral about the gender of the altruist, much of it can
be seen as an idealised representation of the nuclear family, with the male head of the household as the breadwinner, who distributes
resources to every other member of the family.
4the “outside options” should lead to noticeable shifts in the allocation patterns of the household. Bergstrom has
noted, however, that the threat of divorce is rather extreme for a household bargaining model:
To many persons with marital experience, it seems unlikely that couples resolve disagreements about
ordinary household matters by negotiating under the pressure of divorce threats. If one spouse proposes
a resolution to a household dispute and the other does not agree, the expected outcome is not a divorce.
A more likely outcome is harsh words and burnt toast, until the next oﬀer is made. (1996, p.1926)
In the Nash bargaining model the divorce option should therefore be seen as a constraint on the feasible
allocations, rather than as the threat point payoﬀ. The point is that divorce is irrevocable - it represents the
breakdown of bargaining, rather than a position from where to hold out for a better deal. In that sense increases
in the value of being divorced may not reﬂect themselves in increased bargaining power (Chiu and Yang 1999).
Lundberg and Pollak (1993, 1994, 1996) have presented a bargaining model in which the threat point is an
“uncooperative household”. In their model diﬀerent household members specialise in the production of diﬀerent
public goods. In an uncooperative household these goods are underprovided. Unlike the models of Chiappori and
of the “divorce bargaining” models, this account allows for a ﬁnal allocation that is not eﬃcient.
These diﬀerent accounts have diﬀerent empirical implications. In the unitary model, it should not matter who
contributes the income, only total income matters. In the bargaining models, household demand depends also on
who contributes. In the “separate spheres” model of Lundberg and Pollak income (such as transfers) that only
accrues to married women (i.e. which does not change their outside options) will make a diﬀerence to household
demand, provided that the household is in an uncooperative state.
Empirical tests have frequently rejected the implications of the unitary model (Browning et al. 1994, Alderman
et al. 1995). A striking refutation comes from a “natural experiment” in the United Kingdom where changes in
the child beneﬁt payments system led to a reallocation of the funds from the husband to the wife. As a result
there was a measurable change in household expenditures towards female and children’s clothing and away from
men’s clothing (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997). Similarly Thomas (1990) has tested the implications of the
unitary model for Brazil, by examining the impact of unearned income in the hands of mothers versus in the
hands of fathers. The evidence suggested that “resources in the hands of mothers appear to have a bigger impact
on household and child health than resources controlled by fathers”. (Thomas 1990, p.660)
Generally empirical applications have focused on married couples, since other types of households might
introduce heterogeneity which would make the econometric tests less convincing. Nevertheless in many countries
non-nuclear households predominate. Dauphin and Fortin (2001) show how one might test for the number of
decision-makers and for collective rationality given only information about household expenditure decisions and
a set of “distribution factors”, i.e. factors that inﬂuence how resources are shared but do not themselves aﬀect
preferences. We do not have the sort of data that would allow us to operationalise this testing procedure. Instead
we will be content to show that these “distribution factors” seem to matter in ways which are diﬃcult to reconcile
with the standard unitary model. Before outlining this approach, however, we look at some of the existing
5evidence which has analysed allocations within South African households.
3 Resource allocations in South African households
Several studies have suggested that South African (and, in particular Black2) households do not behave as
the unitary model suggests. One widely cited paper is by Duﬂo (2003), which found that pension income in
the hands of grandmothers is used quite diﬀerently than pension income in the hands of grandfathers. The
speciﬁc asymmetry noted by Duﬂo, viz. preferential allocations from grandmothers to granddaughters, can be
rationalised by socio-biological arguments (Cox 2007, p.104). Several other studies have noted gender diﬀerences
in the impact of South Africa’s social pension. Bertrand et al. (2003) suggest that pension receipt leads to labour
force withdrawal by prime age men, but that this eﬀect is much stronger if the recipient is a woman. Posel,
Fairburn and Lund (2006) argue that this result is driven in part by the fact that the Bertrand et al study did not
include migrant workers. They ﬁnd that pensions ﬁnance migrant work by prime-age women, so that arguably
the “resident” household composition changes once a pension has been received. They also suggest that it is
female pensions that have the strongest impact — and that on female migrants. This ﬁnding is supported by the
longitudinal evidence provided in Ardington, Case and Hosegood (forthcoming).
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) also look at diﬀerences in expenditure patterns, but look at the impact of
assets brought into the marriage by men and women. They argue that Black and Indian households in KwaZulu
Natal do not behave in line with the expectations of the unitary model. They suggest that in households where
women bring more resources into the marriage, there are higher education expenditures. Counter to the female-
female linkages found in some of the other studies, they suggest that “fathers schooling has a positive eﬀect
on girls schooling while mothers assets brought to marriage have a negative eﬀect on girls” (Quisumbing and
Maluccio 2003, p.324). This somewhat surprising ﬁnding may be an artefact of the fact that assets are measured
very bluntly; given the tradition of “lobola” (bride price) in Black households, one might not have expected
women to have brought many assets into marriage3.
Ad i ﬀerent test of income pooling is provided by Maitra and Ray (2003). They estimate budget share equations
in which they diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent sources of income: social pension, private transfers and other income.
They ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on these resource variables are very diﬀerent. They note that typically these income
sources accrue to diﬀerent individuals, so that diﬀerences in the way in which these funds are spent suggest that
diﬀerences in the preferences of the individuals controlling those funds (Maitra and Ray 2003, p.44). A more
complicated exercise of this kind in which funds were identiﬁed by the gender of the recipient led to the opposite
conclusion — that resource pooling could not be rejected (Maitra and Ray 2006). Both studies suﬀer somewhat
2It is well-nigh impossible to get away from racial categories in South African social science. We use “Black” in the exclusive
sense, i.e. excluding “Coloured” and “Indian”.
3Indeed the summary statistics suggest that very few did. And given the fact that the sample pooled Blacks (with a tradition
of bride price) and Indians (with a tradition of dowries), it is likely that this measure is useless at diﬀerentiating within the Black
population. The variable is instrumented, but the ﬁrst stage results suggest weak instruments.
6from the fact that African households have been pooled with Indian (in the case of the latter) and also White
and Coloured households (in the former). These households are so diﬀerent in their budgets, income sources and
“cultures” that it is not clear that forcing common coeﬃcients on the control variables is warranted.
Case (2002) provides evidence against income pooling in yet a diﬀerent way. She looks at health outcomes
in households which receive pensions versus those which do not. The survey which she uses asks respondents
whether the household pools resources. Interestingly in those households where respondents indicated in the
aﬃrmative, the pension had a measurably positive impact on health outcomes of non-pension recipients. In the
“non-pooling” households only the pensioner’s health improves on receipt of the pension. This case suggests that
household dynamics and who receives the income makes a diﬀerence on allocation decisions.
The approach taken in this paper is closest in spirit to that of Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003), i.e. we look
at diﬀerences in outcomes with changes in variables that inﬂuence the “bargaining power” of diﬀerent members
of the household. We turn to a simple model that explains how we propose to implement our test.
4A s i m p l e e ﬃcient allocation model
We adopt the framework presented by Browning et al. (1994) but allow n decision-makers in the household. We
assume that individuals maximise a “caring” utility function of the sort
Vi = Vi (U1,U 2,...,U n), i =1 ,...,n,w h e r e ( 1 )
Uj = Uj (uj (xj,l j),G), j =1 ,...,n (2)
Uj is an “egotistical” sub-utility function which is separable in the vector of private consumption goods xj
including leisure lj and the vector of household public goods G.W ea s s u m et h a tVi is a well-behaved preference
function, in the sense that it is non-decreasing in all its arguments. Note that the formulation of the utility
function in equation 1 subsumes the case where individual i does not care for any of the other individuals. In
this instance the weight of those individuals in Vi would simply be zero.
We assume that household allocations are eﬃcient, so that it is impossible to reallocate aggregate house-
hold expenditure without making at least one individual worse oﬀ. Under these circumstances individual i’s
optimisation problem can be written as
max Vi




{yi +( T − li)wi}
Vj ≥ V ∗
j for j 6= i
where p is the vector of prices of the private consumption goods, P is the vector of prices of the public goods, yi
is individual i’s nonlabour income and wi the wage rate and V ∗
j is the reservation utility for individual j.
Under these assumptions Browning et al. (1994) show that the household allocations can be derived as though
they were made in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage the household pays for the optimal level of public goods G out of
7the pooled nonlabour income y =
Pn
i=1 yi. The remaining pooled income is then split among the n individuals,









+( T − li)wi
The individual shares θi are functions of the Lagrange multipliers μj that come from satisfying the constraints
Vj ≥ V ∗
j . Any variables that will inﬂuence the reservation utility attainable by any member of the household will
aﬀect these shares. In particular relative earnings might be relevant. In the unitary model these shares would be
independent of such considerations.
As it stands the model does not consider home production. If the outputs of home production are tradeable
(e.g. cleaning services) then any individual specialising in home production could be thought to be providing
services xk to other individuals that these purchase at the market rate. That individual’s wage rate wi would
then be equivalent to the price pk. It is possible to extend the model above to include home production more
explicitly.
For our purposes the main issue is to consider what might inﬂuence the observed distribution of work and
leisure within South African households. Any variables z that are likely to inﬂuence preferences directly will be
relevant, as will the prices of all commodities, in particular the wage rate. Total household income will also be
important as will any variables that might inﬂuence θi. In short the demand function for li will be
li = li (z,p,P,wi,y,θi) (3)
Variables that inﬂuence θi but not preferences are particularly interesting, since they reveal something about
the inner workings of households. Note that since the shares have to add up to one this imposes constraints on
the impact of these factors. In the empirical part of the paper we will investigate the impact of a set of relatedness
measures ci, which summarise how close a particular individual is to other people in the household. It is diﬃcult
to conceive how such a measure might inﬂuence leisure (and hence work) choices except through θi.I fw ea s s u m e















where c−i is the average of the relatedness measures over other people in the household. This expectation is based
both on the adding up constraint as well as the assumption that only relative diﬀerences in connection should
matter, i.e. shares would not be aﬀected if everyone was moved equally “closer” or “further away” from everyone






8This will be investigated in the empirical part of the paper. If the distribution factors ci d on o tm a t t e ra ta l l ,
then we will not be able to reject the unitary model.
5 Methods
In our empirical work we estimate equations of the sort
li = xiφ + ziγ+ciβ1 + c−iβ2 + εi and (4)





2 + ζi (5)
In these equations xi is a row vector of individual characteristics, such as age, education, gender and marital
status. We do not have any prices (compare to equation 3) so these variables will proxy both for the price of
leisure, i.e. the wage rate, as well as acting as “taste shifters”. zi is a row vector of household characteristics
such as household size, household income (reported only in bands), location (stratum and province) and number
of generations. Besides income4 (which belongs in the regression according to equation 3), these variables can be
thought of as proxying for price variations and taste diﬀerences as well as for diﬀerences in the cost of providing
household public goods. It may be the case, for instance, that individuals in large households do less work and
consume more leisure simply because home production involves high ﬁxed costs and so the per person work load
goes down with household size.
We consider two “distribution factors” ci.T h eﬁrst of these is a measure of “genetic”5 relatedness which we
construct according to Hamilton’s rule (Cox 2007) as follows:
• an individual is related with score 1 to themselves
• related with score 0.5 to siblings, children and parents
• related with score 0.25 to grandchildren, grandparents, uncles, aunts, nephews and nieces
• related with score 0.125 to great-grandchildren, etc.
• related with score 0 to in-laws and other non-related individuals.
We arbitrarily assign the “other related” individuals a score of 0.125. We average the scores to get an “average
relatedness” index for the particular individual concerned. Individuals with higher relatedness scores might be
thought to be more inclined to be altruistic towards other household members. Such individuals might also be
more inclined to engage in work to keep the household aﬂoat. Note, however, that this index is symmetrical —
the other persons in the household will, on average be related with the same score to the individual concerned.
4Total household income is, of course, likely to be endogenous, particularly if hours worked are on the left hand side. This variable
falls out in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions which are also reported.The cross-sectional results when household income is omitted are very
similar to the ones reported in this paper.
5We do not actually have genetic data.
9This raises the possibility of exploitative behaviour of the “lazy rotten kid” type, relying on altruism by the other
individuals to reduce one’s own contribution. Of course the relationship codes that are given in social surveys do
not amount to accurate measures of genetic connections, so our measure is likely to be a very noisy measure of
the true relatedness of the individual.
The idea that “relatedness” might be central in social interactions has been argued by Cox (2007); that it
matters speciﬁcally in South African households has been suggested by Bowles and Posel (2005). The latter study
shows that genetic relatedness helps to predict how much migrant workers will remit to their households of origin.
Nevertheless this study also points to the fact that genetics does not explain everything. It ﬁnds that signiﬁcant
remittances go to wives — even though the genetic relatedness is zero. The authors note that part of this may be
investment in potential future oﬀspring, but altruism is likely to be a signiﬁcant motivator also.
In order to explore some of these dimensions in this study also, we calculate a second measure of relatedness,
an “altruism adjusted relatedness” coeﬃcient in which we arbitrarily score a spouse’s relatedness at 0.5. The
eﬀect of this modiﬁcation is that members of nuclear households are related with a score of 0.5 to every other
member, except themselves (with a score of 1). In our empirical work below we will have cause to compare the
relative performance of the two “altruism” measures.
Corresponding to the two relatedness measures ci, we construct two measures c−i for the other members of the
household. The details of this are in appendix A.2. Individuals living in more complex households will have lower
ci scores and c−i scores, so between them these variables control to some extent for household type. Note that
the c−i scores reﬂect both the symmetrical, reﬂective part of ci, as well as relationships between other individuals
in the household. If all households consisted of just two members ci and c−i would be perfectly collinear. Our
ability to separately estimate these coeﬃcients, particularly also in ﬁxed eﬀects regressions, is based on the fact
that most households have more than two active members.
The second distribution factor that we add to the regression is the age rank of the individual within the
household. The resources that an individual might be able to command within the household may be a factor
where in the birth order or pecking order they fall.
As noted above we test the hypothesis that
β2 = −β1 (6)
Because ci and c−i tend to be highly correlated we estimate also models in which we impose this restriction.
It may seem odd that we want to estimate two separate equations (4) and (5). The reason for this is that certain
types of leisure create positive externalities for other members of the household (Fong and Zhang 2001). We strip
the category “socialising with family” out of our deﬁnition of leisure to create a more strictly private version of
leisure. Furthermore there are other time uses, in particular sleep, which can be thought of as aﬀecting Ti.O t h e r
studies have shown that these also respond to economic incentives (Biddle and Hamermesh 1990, Szalontai 2006).
So while we would hope that our “leisure” regressions (4) provide information congruent with our “work” ones
(5) there is no need for them to do so. To ﬂesh the picture out further we also run regressions with “personal






2 + ξi (7)
There are many reasons to suppose that the equations 4, 5 and 7 may diﬀer between men and women. Conse-
quently we also run separate regressions.
The power in most of these regressions comes from variations between households. It is always possible that
we have omitted some key household level preference variables which contaminate our ﬁndings in relation to ci.
Our most stringent test is one in which we estimate the equations adding in household level ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e. we
estimate the model





















2 + uh + εih (8)
where the subscripts now refer to the i-th individual in the h-th household. Dm
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household ﬁxed eﬀect, which eﬀectively subsumes the vector z of household variables. This speciﬁcation allows
us to investigate the determinants of work and leisure for individuals within the same household.
All our regressions are restricted to black South Africans in order to reduce heterogeneity in our sample to
some extent.
6T h e D a t a
6.1 The South African Time Use Survey
Our measure of time use comes from the South African Time Use Survey (SATUS), a nationally representative
survey run in 2000 (Budlender, Chobokoane and Mpetsheni 2001). The core of the survey is a 24 hour time-diary
completed retrospectively (on the following day) with the assistance of an interviewer. The diary is divided into
thirty minute reporting periods and up to three activities could be recorded in any time slot. Activities were
captured by means of a standardised activity list.
The SATUS was collected in a three stage sampling process. In the ﬁrst stage 872 clusters were selected
randomly from a national sampling frame of areas stratiﬁed according to four area types: formal urban areas,
informal urban areas, rural farm areas and “other” rural areas, i.e. the previous “homeland” areas. Because
sampling at this stage was disproportional we “weight” all our results with the person weights supplied by
Statistics South Africa in order to make them nationally representative.
In the second stage ten households were randomly selected per area and in the ﬁnal stage up to two people
were randomly selected from age-eligible individuals within each household. In all we have information on about
14,000 people in around 8,000 households. The fact that we have more than one individual per household gives
us some ability to compare how diﬀerent types of individuals within the same household allocate their time.
11However since we have also at most two individuals from any one household we do not have a full time budget
for the entire household. Our ability to look at shifts in the aggregate time budget (analogous to the analyses
conducted on aggregate household expenditures, e.g. by Browning et al. (1994)) is therefore severely constrained.
It also reduces the power of our “ﬁxed eﬀects” estimates, as we will see below. Finally it has the eﬀe c tt h a ts m a l l
households are over-represented in our individual level sample. This is another reason why it is important to
weight the estimates.
Another point to note about the sample design is that the SATUS information was collected in three tranches.
One third was conducted in February, one third in June and one third in October. This allows us to measure
some seasonal eﬀects. Interviews were also staggered over the week, so that roughly one seventh of the sample
was interviewed on each day of the week. Again this gives some insight into the weekly rhythms of activities.
The information was collected through three separate instruments. The ﬁrst of these is a household level survey.
This survey collected background information on the household. It also collected information on members of the
household. It is from this membership roster that two respondents were selected for the second stage. Once
the respondents had been identiﬁed, the relationships of all the other individuals to the two selected ones were
captured. Since the relationship codes are organised around the respondents we can construct the “connectedness”
variables directly, without having to infer the relationships between two individuals through a third party, e.g.
the head of the household.
The second instrument is an individual level survey which records educational attainment, marital status and
other useful information. The third instrument is the diary itself.
6.2 The dependent variables
As noted above we have three diﬀerent dependent variables, namely:
1. Minutes worked
This includes paid work, informal production work, looking for work, collecting wood or water, domestic
chores, child care, attendance at school and home work. The inclusion of school attendance and home work
is motivated by the fact that many young adults in South Africa still attend school. Furthermore one might
view the educational eﬀorts of younger members of the household as creating a certain kind of household
public good. The other activities included in this category are indicated in the top block of table 1.
2. Minutes spent on private leisure
This includes “socialising with non-family members”, “doing nothing”, participation in games, recreational
activities, watching television, listening to the radio and reading
3. Minutes spent on personal care
This includes sleeping, eating and personal hygiene.
126.3 Personal characteristics
The age of the respondent turns out to matter a great deal. In order to allow maximum ﬂexibility we included
a quintic in age. Educational attainment is measured in quite a crude way in the survey. We have the number
of school years completed and then only an indicator variable for whether the individual has any post-school
qualiﬁcation. In addition we included dummy variables for marital status.
6.4 Household characteristics
Household size is an important control variable for reasons outlined in section 5. We also included the number
of generations in the household on the assumption that individuals who stayed in households with multiple
generations might have diﬀerent preferences (e.g. they might be more conservative in their social attitudes) or
the existence of large age ranges might aﬀect the range of household production tasks that might have to be
undertaken.
Household income was captured very badly in the survey. It consisted of one question which asked the
respondent to place the household in one of a series of income brackets.
6.5 “Distribution factors”
We discussed the construction of our relatedness variable in the previous section. As Table 2 indicates, our
estimation sample shows a fair range in this variable, from a minimum of 0.1 to a maximum of 1 (in single person
households). Figure 1 shows the empirical distribution within the data set. The massive spike at 0.5 is due to
the fact that there are many diﬀerent ways of getting to this number: being a member of a couple; a parent
in a nuclear household with any number of children; a granny living with her daughter and two grandchildren;
among others. The concentration at this spike creates some diﬃculty in the estimation. It reduces the variation
in the cross-section which reduces the precision of the estimates. It also leads to collinearity with the relatedness
variable for the other household members, i.e. c−i. Indeed in many households (e.g. couples) the values are the
same for all respondents from the same household. This means that the variation in these measures, particularly
in the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, comes mainly from complex households.
Construction of the c−i variables is made more tricky by the fact that many of these relationships have to be
inferred through third parties, viz. the respondents. We discuss the construction of this measure in more detail
in the appendix.
The second “distribution factor” that we included was the age rank in the household. In this case we did
not include c−i, i.e. the average age rank of all the other individuals, since this almost perfectly collinear with
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Figure 1: Distribution of the relatedness variable in the SATUS data set.
7R e s u l t s
We present summary statistics for our estimation sample in Table 2. The mean minutes worked, spent on leisure
and personal care conﬁrm the fact that men seem to spend less time working and more time on private leisure.
There are some diﬀerences between the characteristics of men and women, but not enough to expect us to be
able to explain the large diﬀerence in time allocation by some non-gender related mechanism.
Table 3 presents the regression results for the work regressions (equation 5). In column 1 we pool men and
women together. The results suggest that men spend almost an hour less on all types of work than women, after
controlling for all the measured characteristics. This result conﬁrms the results from the summary statistics.
Work increases with education, since this increases the opportunity costs of time spent on leisure. Surprisingly
household size and the number of generations seem to matter very little, but work decreases markedly with the
position of the individual in the household. The “age rank” variable shows that more junior members (even
controlling for age) do less work than more senior ones.
The relatedness coeﬃcient suggests that individuals that are more closely connected to others in households
do more work than more peripheral household members. While this coeﬃcient is positive, the coeﬃcient on c−i
is negative. Both are individually statistically signiﬁcant and a test of their joint signiﬁcance (listed at the foot of
the column) rejects the idea that they could both be zero. A test of the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are equal
in magnitude and of opposite sign is accepted. It is also listed at the foot of the column as an “eﬃciency test”.
14The positive sign on the relatedness coeﬃcient is readily explained in terms of altruism: individuals who are
closer to other members of the household are more willing to allow these individuals to beneﬁt from their work.




In order to calibrate the magnitude of the eﬀect it is useful to consider a shift from the 10th percentile of the
distribution of the relatedness variable (with a score of .3303571) to the 90th percentile (with a score of .6666667).
The former score corresponds to an individual living with two children, ten grandchildren and a “relation”, while
the latter corresponds to a single parent. Since there is no spouse in either household, the adjusted relatedness
variables are identical, so we will consider this shift for both versions of the variable. In the regression under
consideration, the individual living in the household with closer relationships would be doing an extra twenty-four
minutes a day of work.
B e c a u s ew eh a v er e a s o n st obe l i e v et h a tt h e s ef u n c t i o n sm a ybed i ﬀerent for men and women we show the results
of gender speciﬁc regressions in columns 2 to 5. In columns 3 and 5 we impose the restriction that ∂θi
∂ci = − ∂θi
∂c−i
(equation 6) after showing in the previous columns that the data accept it. We observe an asymmetry in this
impact. The results suggest that men that are more closely related to others in the household do more work than
more peripheral males, but the eﬀect in the case of women is small in absolute terms, particularly in column 5.
Although it is not immediately evident from the coeﬃcients of the quintic, the results imply that men work
less than women (on average) and that the gap increases markedly with age.
Our preferred speciﬁcations are the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions (see equation 8) which are reported in column six
and column seven. In column seven we have used the “altruism adjusted” version of the relatedness variable, in
contrast with the more pure “genetic” variant used in the previous columns. In order to make the fully interacted
models more readable we report the coeﬃcients in two separate columns, although they have been derived from one
regression in each case. We prefer the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions because they deal with any unobserved household
heterogeneity. They get at the issue of what happens within households more eﬀectively than regressions which
also rely on variations between households. They also eﬀectively eliminate one and two person households from
the regression. It is hardly surprising that individuals in one person households would be more inclined to work!
Considering the results in column six ﬁrst, we see that the gender asymmetry reappears, except in quite a
diﬀerent form. After controlling for household level eﬀects, it is the women who do more work in response to
their level of relatedness, while the men seem to reduce their eﬀort. Taken at face value the male result suggests
strategic behaviour — understanding that other individuals in the household care for them (the symmetric, reﬂexive
part of ci), they seem to free-ride on that altruism, i.e. they behave like “lazy rotten kids”. However, neither
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at the foot of the table, although this is a diﬀerent joint test than the ones reported in columns (1), (2) and (4).
Although insigniﬁcant, the coeﬃcients are sizable, suggesting that men that move from the 10th percentile to the
90th percentile of the relatedness distribution would do twenty-seven minutes less work a day, while the same
15shift would increase a woman’s work load, on average, by twenty-ﬁve minutes. We test whether, in fact, these
male and female coeﬃcients could be equal, but we reject this test at the 10% level. This is indicated also at
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prompted by the size and sign of the coeﬃcients; the symmetry is suggestive, although not directly mandated by
the theory. The data accept this “rotten kid” hypothesis.
Analysing some of the other coeﬃcients, it appears as though the marital codes have absorbed some of the
eﬀect attributed to the relatedness variable in column three. The coeﬃcient on the “married” dummy variable
for males is particularly striking, suggesting that single males (the “lazy sons”) do much less work than their
fathers, or indeed the female members of the households. The latter claim derives from a consideration of the
gender-speciﬁcq u i n t i c si na g eg i v e ni nc o l u m ns i x .I no r d e rt om a k et h e s em o r ei n t e r p r e t a b l e ,w eh a v eg e n e r a t e d
predictions from the given regression output for a person with twelve years of education, no post-school training,
living (as dependent) in a four person nuclear household. We have set the age rank to one. The predicted number
of minutes worked is shown in Figure 2. It is interesting to note that the gap from age forty to sixty is constantly
around ninety minutes. This is just a little larger than the size of the “married” dummy for men.
When we use the adjusted relatedness coeﬃcient (in column seven) the coeﬃcient on the female coeﬃcient
is sizable, implying thirty-six extra minutes of work each day for the shift from the 10th percentile to the 90th
percentile considered earlier. The coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Nevertheless the joint test and
the equality and “exploitation” tests reported at the foot of that table are all insigniﬁcant.
In Table 4 we repeat these analyses, except that our dependent variable is private leisure. Many of the
results are very similar. Interestingly enough, the “household size” variable now seems to matter in the cross-
sectional regressions, while the relatedness variable does not seem to matter much. Once we include household
ﬁxed eﬀects, however, the results are much more dramatic. We again see strong gender asymmetries. Using the
standard relatedness coeﬃcient (in column six) we see a strongly positive coeﬃcient for the men (signiﬁcant at
the 5% level) and a sizable (though not signiﬁcant) negative coeﬃcient for the women. The shift from the 10th
to the 90th percentile of the relatedness variable would imply forty-six more minutes of leisure for the man and
seventeen minutes less for the woman, a total diﬀerence of sixty-three minutes. The tests reported at the foot of
the table reject the idea that both coeﬃcients could be zero or that they could be equal at the 5% level. The data
accept the hypothesis that they could be of the same magnitude and opposite sign. This is strong evidence in
favour of a “rotten sons” interpretation. It is also consistent with the Bertrand et al. (2003) study which suggests
that sons are able to beneﬁt disproportionately from their mother’s pensions in terms of increased leisure. Again
there is a marked contrast between single and married men, with the former enjoying an extra hour of private
leisure a day.
The evidence from the “adjusted” relatedness coeﬃcient (in column seven) gives qualitatively the same result,
although in this case it is the woman’s coeﬃc i e n tt h a ti ss t r o n g l ys i g n i ﬁcant (at the 1% level). The coeﬃcients
translate to forty-three minutes less leisure for women and twenty-eight minutes more for men for the shift
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Figure 2: Predictions of minutes spent working from ﬁxed eﬀects regression model for single individual with 12
years education, no post-school training, living in a four person nuclear household.
that both coeﬃcients could be zero or that they could be equal. We accept the hypothesis that they could be of
equal magnitude and opposite sign.
In Figure 3 we repeat the previous exercise of generating the predicted relationship between minutes spent on
leisure by age for men and women (based on the model in column six). We observe an increasing gap between
men and women which reaches its maximum at age 27, with a diﬀerence of 79.5 minutes. Thereafter the gap
stays above sixty minutes (the size of the “married” coeﬃcient) and increases again above age ﬁfty. Men in their
late teens and twenties and men nearing retirement seem to have more private leisure than anyone else.
In Table 5 we run the analyses with minutes spent on personal care as the dependent variable. The main
point of these regressions is to verify that the results are not driven by some other strange dynamics. We observe
that there is little evidence that household structure or the “distribution factors” have any impact on personal
care within the household. The only somewhat interesting feature is that married men spend about twenty-ﬁve
minutes less on personal care (mainly sleep) than single men, once household ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for.
8 Discussion
Our analyses support the ﬁndings — already evident in the summary statistics — that there is a marked imbalance
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Figure 3: Predictions of minutes spent on private leisure from ﬁxed eﬀects regression model for single individual
with 12 years education, no post-school training, living in a four person nuclear household.
appearing to be the largest slackers. These ﬁndings could be reconciled with the unitary model if one assumed
that all household members agreed that these men should be allowed to enjoy their lives.
T h es i z ea n ds i g n i ﬁcance of the relatedness coeﬃcient, even in ﬁxed eﬀects regressions, undermines this
argument. It is hard to see how this variable could impact on the household allocation process except through
the individual shares θi. This, however, is not consistent with the unitary model. Of course if the unitary
model has to be abandoned, the assumption that the lopsided division of labour within the household represents
common preferences needs to be abandoned also. An alternative explanation of these imbalances is that they
reﬂect imbalances in power or altruism. The men either extract more leisure by force, or they free-ride on the
altruism of their women.
The gender speciﬁc impact of the relatedness variable is particularly suggestive. In both the work and the
leisure ﬁxed eﬀects regressions it appears that the relatedness variable acts to increase the leisure and reduce the
work of men, but does the opposite for women. In all cases we accept the hypothesis that these impacts are of
equal magnitude and opposite sign.
This asymmetry could be based on gender-speciﬁc norms regarding the division of household labour. Perhaps
women are expected to service their sons and brothers. Understanding these expectations, those men in turn
reduce their work load. More speculatively there could be socio-biological asymmetries too. Perhaps young
men improve their marriage prospects by “socialising with non-family members” outside the household, whereas
18young women’s marriage chances are not equally improved. This might explain the age proﬁle of the “private
leisure” graph shown in Figure 3. It might also explain why it is unmarried “sons” that seem the worst slackers.
Understanding that their close female relatives (mothers and sisters) will be at least in part concerned for their
marriage prospects also, these young men may increase this type of leisure consumption. The division of work and
leisure that we see may therefore be in the interests of the genes promoting them; this is not the same as saying
that they are in the interests of the individuals concerned! The point is that the same underlying mechanism
(norms, male courtship displays) may work asymmetrically in men and women.
The existence of a common mechanism does not, of course, rescue the unitary model. It merely conﬁrms that
the outcome may be a Nash equilibrium: women will allow men to consume more leisure given the behaviour of
the men; and the men will reduce their work given the behaviour of the women. Within this equilibrium men and
women who are diﬀerently positioned will be able to take or yield less leisure. More peripheral men will do more
work while more peripheral women will do less. The division of work and leisure is the outcome of a strategic
interaction within the household; it cannot be read oﬀ some common household utility function.
Of course, as the R2 measures in the regressions conﬁrm, our models only explain a small fraction of the
variation in work and leisure both between and within households. If norms or genetic factors inﬂuence the
balance of work and play within households, they certainly do not determine it. There seem to be many additional
factors outside the ambit of our models. One interesting feature of our results, however, is that the “adjusted”
versions of our relatedness measures do not make a major diﬀerence to our results. The size of the gap between
the male and female coeﬃcients in the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions is very similar, although the precise numbers are
somewhat diﬀerent. At most some of the cross-sectional coeﬃcients (not reported here) increase by perhaps 10%
using the adjusted measures. In this regard our results are diﬀerent from those of Bowles and Posel (2005) where
weighting spouses up from zero increased the variation explained quite markedly. This, of course, does not imply
that genetics drives the results. It may simply reﬂect that the balance of work and leisure is driven much more by
the inter-generational relations than the relationships between husbands and wives. Indeed the size of the male
“married” coeﬃcient suggests that married men are more inclined to be hardworking members of the household.
It appears that the marital status variable is a more reliable indicator of the degree of altruism felt by a male
towards other members of his household than the closeness of the relationships themselves
9C o n c l u s i o n
The evidence has been stacking up that households in general and South African households in particular do not
conform to the unitary model. Our results add to this literature in two respects. We are able to provide a richer
measure of work and leisure than the existing literature has been able to. Furthermore we have shown that the
intra-household division of labour is sensitive to how closely related the individuals are to other members of the
household. It appears that young men are behaving in ways reminiscent of the “lazy rotten kids” of Bergstrom’s
paper. They seem to understand that the women to whom they are related will allow them to get away with
19doing less work or enjoying more leisure. We are not able to determine what mechanism underpins this result.
Both norm-driven and socio-biological explanations are possible.
The interaction of the relatedness and marriage variables suggests that the position of young men within
their households is an interesting area for further research. Clearly we need to prise open the “black box” of
the household much further. The relationships between these young men, their fathers and the women in their
households would not be a bad starting point. Our evidence suggests, to paraphrase Aristotle, that sons seem to
avoid aiding their family because they enjoy getting the beneﬁts, but avoid doing them!
AA p p e n d i x
A.1 Derivations
Let each θi (c1,...,c n) be a function of the individual speciﬁc attributes c1,...,c n. We will consider the impact
of changes in these shares in the vicinity of a symmetrical distribution, i.e. one where c1 = ...= cn and where
the baseline shares are roughly equal. We assume that the functional forms are such that the impact of these
distribution factors c1,...,c n is symmetrical on the shares θi,s ot h a t∂θi
∂cj '
∂θj













One immediate implication is that the cross-impacts ∂θi
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We can extend this example if we assume that the shares θi (c1,...,c n) are homogeneous of degree zero in



































In the vicinity of any point where ci is similar to c−i it follows that the impacts should be of equal magnitude








Comparing coeﬃcients we see that ∂θi
∂ci = − ∂θi
∂c−i.
A.2 Construction of the c−i variable
In order to work out the relationship scores between two individuals from their relationship to a third reference






child-grandchild 0.375 The grandchild could be either the child of the child, or a nephew











parent-grandparent 0.25 This ignores the possibility that the grandparent may be the






grandchild-grandchild 0.375 They could be siblings or cousins
granchild-“relation” 0.125
unrelated-... 0
Since in most cases we had two respondents in the survey, there would potentially be two diﬀerent ways of
21coding the relationships between two other individuals in the household. We scored the relationship both ways
and then took the average of the two scores . This would give us an average connectedness score cj for every
member j diﬀerent from the respondent i.W h e r ej was the other respondent we scored them directly, using the
scores outlined in section 5. Once we had calculated these scores we calculated c−i as the average of these scores
over all the other individuals. For the purposes of single person households we set c−i =0 .
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24Table 1: Time Allocation by black South Africans
Type of time use: Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Wage work 74.5 5.60 181.7 9.28 37.3 2.95 88.1 5.37
Domestic wage work 21.3 2.29 3.5 1.20 10.1 1.00 1.8 0.50
Primary production 10.0 1.76 18.5 3.34 11.5 1.47 25.5 2.97
Service work 21.2 2.59 19.7 3.13 12.5 1.42 13.3 1.58
Travel to work 20.4 1.36 41.8 2.11 10.5 0.75 20.3 1.23
Look for work 2.4 0.63 15.8 2.24 1.4 0.31 8.5 1.19
Other work 5.8 0.79 15.5 2.45 2.9 0.36 7.4 0.98
Cooking 103.9 3.21 21.0 1.49 85.2 1.84 19.6 1.13
Cleaning 57.1 2.23 28.3 2.24 49.5 1.44 25.4 1.46
Caring for kids 43.5 2.49 3.3 0.64 32.1 1.63 2.6 0.36
Other household work 61.7 2.80 33.1 2.51 48.6 1.71 30.7 1.52
Collect water 8.9 1.28 1.6 0.33 10.1 1.04 3.9 0.47
Collect wood 6.4 1.13 1.3 0.67 6.6 0.93 3.5 0.90
Attending school 3.8 0.97 4.4 1.35 69.2 3.85 80.7 4.58
Doing homework 2.3 0.45 4.9 1.41 16.1 1.05 19.0 1.43
Community work 5.7 1.13 6.5 1.79 3.4 0.50 5.6 1.06
Watching TV 61.7 3.50 70.1 3.60 61.1 3.05 66.0 2.80
Socialising with nonfamily members 36.5 2.07 84.3 4.59 37.8 1.46 71.0 2.60
Recreation 6.8 1.26 14.4 1.85 8.9 1.16 27.2 2.80
Participate in games 0.6 0.16 4.4 1.60 18.1 1.37 26.0 1.97
Listen to radio 33.1 2.08 36.2 2.23 28.0 1.32 30.3 1.39
Read mass media 3.9 0.60 5.8 0.74 3.9 0.42 5.1 0.46
Doing nothing 42.9 2.64 42.9 2.72 44.5 2.20 41.4 2.13
Socialising with family members 69.9 3.46 56.7 3.47 67.7 2.55 50.6 2.09
Sleeping 574.6 3.57 548.5 5.36 586.5 2.80 570.5 3.74
Eating 57.2 1.03 66.0 1.73 60.3 0.81 67.3 1.07
Personal hygiene 34.0 0.82 37.4 1.12 35.7 0.66 39.1 0.90
The numbers do not add up to 1440 minutes, because categories like religious observance and various other types of travel have not been listed
Notes: Own calculations from the South African Time Use Survey 2000. Estimates are weighted using the person weights supplied by 
Statistics South Africa. The standard errors have been corrected for clustering. Prime age is defined as ages 25 to 50, inclusive.
Prime age individuals All














work 401.6 411.1 0 1260 424.9 426.4 0 1225 374.9 393.7 0 1260
private leisure 260.1 254.4 0 1050 223.1 223.8 0 1050 302.5 289.3 0 990
personal care 678.7 677.1 30 1440 680.9 682.3 30 1440 676.2 671.2 50 1440
age 30.2 32.4 10 99 31.1 32.9 10 98 29.1 31.9 10 99
Years of education 6.85 6.76 0 12 6.83 6.75 0 12 6.89 6.76 0 12
Post-matric qualification 0.083 0.082 0 1 0.079 0.082 0 1 0.087 0.081 0 1
Male 0.466 0.467 0 1
Single (base category) 0.640 0.551 0 1 0.614 0.535 0 1 0.670 0.570 0 1
Married/Living together 0.282 0.357 0 1 0.267 0.335 0 1 0.299 0.381 0 1
Widowed 0.050 0.055 0 1 0.084 0.086 0 1 0.011 0.018 0 1
Divorced/Separated 0.028 0.038 0 1 0.035 0.043 0 1 0.020 0.031 0 1
Household size 5.80 4.30 1 24 5.90 4.52 1 24 5.70 4.05 1 18
relatedness 0.51 0.57 0.1 1 0.51 0.55 0.1 1 0.52 0.60 0.111 1
HH relatedness 0.42 0.42 0 0.792 0.44 0.45 0 0.760 0.41 0.39 0 0.792
relatedness (adjusted) 0.542 0.617 0.1 1 0.532 0.594 0.1 1 0.553 0.644 0.111 1
HH relatedness (adjusted) 0.440 0.454 0 0.792 0.452 0.480 0 0.760 0.426 0.425 0 0.792
Number of generations 2.25 1.98 1 5 2.32 2.11 1 5 2.17 1.84 1 5
pnr of person interviewed 2.89 2.22 1 9 2.86 2.30 1 9 2.91 2.14 1 9
Tranche
February (base) 0.344 0.325 0 1 0.342 0.331 0 1 0.346 0.317 0 1
June 0.328 0.339 0 1 0.342 0.337 0 1 0.312 0.341 0 1
October 0.328 0.336 0 1 0.316 0.332 0 1 0.342 0.341 0 1
Day of the week
Monday (base) 0.181 0.178 0 1 0.178 0.177 0 1 0.183 0.179 0 1
Tuesday 0.168 0.169 0 1 0.177 0.173 0 1 0.157 0.164 0 1
Wednesday 0.127 0.143 0 1 0.125 0.138 0 1 0.129 0.149 0 1
Thursday 0.111 0.110 0 1 0.113 0.109 0 1 0.109 0.110 0 1
Friday 0.138 0.126 0 1 0.136 0.125 0 1 0.140 0.128 0 1
Saturday 0.102 0.112 0 1 0.092 0.107 0 1 0.113 0.118 0 1
Sunday 0.174 0.162 0 1 0.179 0.172 0 1 0.168 0.150 0 1
Stratum
urban formal (base) 0.364 0.325 0 1 0.354 0.325 0 1 0.375 0.324 0 1
urban informal 0.114 0.296 0 1 0.110 0.295 0 1 0.118 0.296 0 1
other rural 0.472 0.229 0 1 0.491 0.251 0 1 0.450 0.204 0 1
farm 0.051 0.151 0 1 0.045 0.128 0 1 0.057 0.176 0 1
All: n=10479 Female: n=5589 Male: n=4890Province
WC (base) 0.028 0.053 0 1 0.028 0.048 0 1 0.029 0.058 0 1
EC 0.170 0.133 0 1 0.177 0.144 0 1 0.162 0.120 0 1
NC 0.009 0.039 0 1 0.009 0.039 0 1 0.009 0.039 0 1
FS 0.075 0.124 0 1 0.072 0.120 0 1 0.078 0.128 0 1
KZ 0.220 0.161 0 1 0.228 0.165 0 1 0.212 0.158 0 1
NW 0.097 0.089 0 1 0.094 0.088 0 1 0.100 0.091 0 1
GT 0.177 0.148 0 1 0.165 0.140 0 1 0.191 0.156 0 1
MP 0.076 0.121 0 1 0.078 0.120 0 1 0.074 0.123 0 1
LP 0.148 0.131 0 1 0.150 0.136 0 1 0.145 0.126 0 1
Household income category
0-399 (base) 0.215 0.245 0 1 0.210 0.242 0 1 0.221 0.248 0 1
400-799 0.345 0.325 0 1 0.364 0.348 0 1 0.324 0.299 0 1
800-1199 0.158 0.165 0 1 0.163 0.162 0 1 0.152 0.168 0 1
1200-1799 0.107 0.110 0 1 0.096 0.100 0 1 0.119 0.121 0 1
1800-2499 0.063 0.057 0 1 0.059 0.054 0 1 0.067 0.061 0 1
2500-4999 0.052 0.048 0 1 0.049 0.045 0 1 0.055 0.052 0 1
5000-9999 0.018 0.014 0 1 0.015 0.013 0 1 0.022 0.016 0 1
10000+ 0.004 0.003 0 1 0.004 0.004 0 1 0.003 0.002 0 1
Don't Know 0.033 0.026 0 1 0.034 0.027 0 1 0.032 0.026 0 1
Refused to answer 0.006 0.006 0 1 0.005 0.005 0 1 0.006 0.006 0 1
Note: The sample includes only black South Africans. The weighted means were calculated using the person weights supplied by Statistics South Africa.Table 3: Determinants of minutes worked by black South Africans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Men Men - 
restricted
Women Women - 
restricted
Men Women Men Women
age 27.372 33.423 33.427 29.263 28.14 16.697 24.044 16.33 24.168
[12.581]* [17.850]+ [17.854]+ [16.202]+ [16.084]+ [17.395] [15.840] [17.479] [15.858]
age^2/100 -155.606 -192.312 -192.444 -167.093 -161.783 -114.011 -113.41 -110.12 -114.621
[65.725]* [95.654]* [95.713]* [86.506]+ [85.972]+ [93.786] [86.191] [94.330] [86.359]
age^3/1000 40.099 48.057 48.104 44.638 43.524 34.008 29.379 32.85 29.757
[15.375]** [22.706]* [22.720]* [20.784]* [20.672]* [22.512] [21.115] [22.649] [21.170]
age^4/10000 -4.819 -5.57 -5.577 -5.522 -5.416 -4.545 -3.791 -4.406 -3.838
[1.646]** [2.442]* [2.444]* [2.291]* [2.280]* [2.455]+ [2.366] [2.469]+ [2.374]
age^5/100000 0.21 0.237 0.237 0.246 0.242 0.211 0.177 0.205 0.179
[0.066]** [0.097]* [0.097]* [0.094]** [0.094]** [0.099]* [0.098]+ [0.099]* [0.099]+
Years of education 4.849 3.138 3.141 7.107 7.152 6.703 6.447 6.682 6.304
[1.304]** [2.012] [2.014] [1.522]** [1.512]** [1.802]** [1.444]** [1.811]** [1.449]**
Post-matric qualification 11.785 27.962 27.966 -5.067 -4.989 10.696 -16.676 10.851 -17.214
[12.746] [20.304] [20.308] [14.581] [14.581] [18.041] [16.177] [18.070] [16.142]
Male -55.53 82.898 76.702
[6.158]** [140.740] [140.877]
Married/Living together 37.788 55.859 55.724 24.698 22.939 77.563 8.058 79.098 4.495
[9.879]** [17.436]** [17.415]** [11.020]* [11.075]* [17.369]** [12.289] [17.465]** [12.013]
Widowed -5.701 -71.239 -71.184 -14.084 -14.86 38.734 15.723 34.938 16.769
[17.339] [37.397]+ [37.363]+ [18.733] [18.735] [47.620] [19.864] [47.785] [19.865]
Divorced/Separated 36.238 46.115 46.147 26.736 26.52 45.79 39.991 45.379 39.731
[18.288]* [33.126] [33.106] [21.660] [21.708] [42.973] [25.409] [42.901] [25.434]
Household size 0.593 -1.728 -1.833 1.559 0.783
[1.701] [2.868] [2.515] [2.074] [1.870]
relatedness (1) 70.872 77.203 74.433 41.755 21.071 -79.741 73.839 -20.004 107.752
[23.670]** [37.625]* [17.877]** [28.953] [17.219] [66.983] [55.894] [76.648] [64.349]+
HH relatedness (1) -44.419 -72.32 -74.433 -4.594 -21.071 79.741 -73.839 20.004 -107.752
[21.101]* [34.062]* [25.396]
Number of generations -3.123 -7.18 -7.263 -2.648 -2.992
[5.161] [8.140] [8.226] [5.464] [5.457]
Age rank in HH (1=oldest) -6.187 -3.649 -3.671 -5.649 -6.091 -0.598 6.131 -0.459 6.439
[3.171]+ [4.783] [4.754] [4.110] [4.044] [4.677] [4.752] [4.664] [4.726]
Controls for day of week Y Y Y Y Y
Controls for tranche, stratum, 




Observations 10479 4890 4890 5589 5589
Number of households
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25
Joint test (P): 0.000 0.000 0.319
Efficiency test (P): 0.473 0.937 0.376
Equality test (P):
Exploitation test (P):
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%




















0.089 0.221Table 4: Determinants of minutes spent on private leisure by black South Africans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Men Men - 
restricted
Women Women - 
restricted
Men Women Men Women
age -11.249 -0.273 -0.239 -28.884 -27.543 15.211 -16.289 16.202 -16.835
[10.431] [15.500] [15.533] [13.552]* [13.409]* [14.640] [12.245] [14.758] [12.286]
age^2/100 61.675 23.388 22.433 137.723 131.38 -44.796 75.138 -52.794 78.401
[55.755] [83.578] [83.906] [72.326]+ [71.619]+ [79.975] [64.920] [80.697] [65.172]
age^3/1000 -16.137 -10.454 -10.107 -31.401 -30.07 1.107 -18.683 3.258 -19.518
[13.271] [19.959] [20.060] [17.360]+ [17.206]+ [19.432] [15.462] [19.603] [15.527]
age^4/10000 2.033 1.711 1.664 3.468 3.34 0.896 2.291 0.653 2.382
[1.443] [2.164] [2.177] [1.914]+ [1.898]+ [2.148] [1.687] [2.165] [1.694]
age^5/100000 -0.094 -0.092 -0.09 -0.145 -0.141 -0.071 -0.103 -0.061 -0.107
[0.058] [0.087] [0.087] [0.079]+ [0.078]+ [0.088] [0.068] [0.089] [0.069]
Years of education 2.237 4.222 4.244 0.718 0.663 -1.394 -1.804 -1.373 -1.588
[0.961]* [1.537]** [1.535]** [1.173] [1.170] [1.385] [1.136] [1.393] [1.137]
Post-matric qualification 5.704 0.738 0.767 12.221 12.128 10.589 5.312 10.389 6.168
[10.891] [17.601] [17.614] [10.825] [10.804] [14.868] [12.661] [14.877] [12.576]
Male 77.932 -229.51 -229.475
[5.051]** [113.921]* [114.235]*
Married/Living together -34.256 -58.197 -59.18 -14.773 -12.673 -60.495 -5.099 -65.353 -3.431
[8.455]** [14.746]** [14.493]** [8.744]+ [8.650] [13.940]** [9.290] [13.969]** [9.229]
Widowed 4.289 73.905 74.309 4.531 5.457 10.942 -9.222 16.702 -10.42
[15.541] [42.253]+ [42.254]+ [16.023] [15.919] [37.665] [16.396] [37.477] [16.492]
Divorced/Separated -37.118 -61.783 -61.546 -21.7 -21.443 -65.539 -61.25 -63.835 -60.363
[13.543]** [25.567]* [25.604]* [15.652] [15.689] [28.067]* [19.801]** [27.972]* [19.818]**
Household size -3.723 0.405 -0.356 -5.948 -5.021
[1.680]* [2.658] [2.516] [1.783]** [1.730]**
relatedness (1) -7.02 8.502 -11.661 -6.558 18.148 135.515 -50.362 82.752 -128.687
[20.277] [33.969] [14.112] [22.442] [13.392] [56.230]* [44.843] [64.164] [49.199]**
HH relatedness (1) -0.298 27.044 11.661 -37.829 -18.148 -135.515 50.362 -82.752 128.687
[15.309] [26.277] [18.754]*
Number of generations 6.709 9.428 8.82 6.274 6.685
[4.367] [7.791] [7.652] [4.232] [4.248]
Age rank in HH (1=oldest) 8.89 4.719 4.563 9.079 9.607 6.292 1.467 5.664 0.827
[2.854]** [4.458] [4.452] [3.000]** [2.967]** [4.048] [4.050] [4.052] [4.022]
Controls for day of week Y Y Y Y Y
Controls for tranche, stratum, 




Observations 10479 4890 4890 5589 5589
Households
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14
Joint test (P): 0.937 0.550 0.132
Efficiency test (P): 0.802 0.503 0.155
Equality test (P):
Exploitation test (P):
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%




















0.011 0.013Table 5: Determinants of minutes spent on personal care by black South Africans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Men Men - 
restricted
Women Women - 
restricted
Men Women Men Women
age -18.389 -26.922 -26.913 -11.726 -12.44 -29.724 -27.294 -30.19 -26.95
[7.595]* [11.599]* [11.591]* [9.789] [9.869] [10.162]** [9.070]** [10.202]** [9.045]**
age^2/100 91.867 133.624 133.388 62.695 66.072 139.734 136.317 142.304 134.515
[40.937]* [65.278]* [65.210]* [51.072] [51.463] [55.104]* [48.583]** [55.354]* [48.494]**
age^3/1000 -21.258 -29.097 -29.011 -16.576 -17.284 -30.371 -33.006 -30.939 -32.603
[9.856]* [16.119]+ [16.102]+ [12.264] [12.351] [13.273]* [11.780]** [13.339]* [11.770]**
age^4/10000 2.298 2.941 2.929 2.01 2.078 3.162 3.779 3.218 3.74
[1.081]* [1.786] [1.784] [1.376] [1.385] [1.450]* [1.313]** [1.458]* [1.313]**
age^5/100000 -0.09 -0.109 -0.109 -0.085 -0.088 -0.124 -0.158 -0.126 -0.157
[0.044]* [0.072] [0.072] [0.058] [0.059] [0.058]* [0.054]** [0.059]* [0.054]**
Years of education -5.409 -5.775 -5.769 -5.625 -5.596 -3.998 -3.485 -3.989 -3.508
[0.736]** [1.070]** [1.070]** [1.010]** [1.013]** [1.026]** [0.926]** [1.032]** [0.923]**
Post-matric qualification -21.019 -42.503 -42.496 1.336 1.386 -23.784 4.291 -23.85 4.061
[8.921]* [12.853]** [12.863]** [9.306] [9.297] [11.389]* [10.677] [11.386]* [10.687]
Male -1.121 18.576 25.347
[3.989] [81.536] [81.226]
Married/Living together -12.115 -21.954 -22.197 -5.382 -6.5 -25.042 -8.117 -23.438 -6.803
[6.531]+ [11.019]* [11.064]* [6.843] [6.696] [10.533]* [7.827] [10.614]* [7.506]
Widowed 1.422 7.011 7.111 15.135 14.642 7.72 -13.628 7.449 -13.605
[10.977] [25.996] [25.998] [10.735] [10.724] [29.513] [12.794] [29.609] [12.804]
Divorced/Separated 0.847 7.064 7.122 -3.988 -4.125 12.987 3.102 12.349 2.861
[11.264] [21.793] [21.744] [12.778] [12.788] [27.704] [14.596] [27.747] [14.597]
Household size 0.219 -2.186 -2.374 2.071 1.577
[1.237] [2.151] [2.044] [1.316] [1.229]
relatedness (1) -5.041 -26.219 -31.204 24.33 11.179 -9.496 -22.168 -39.826 11.677
[14.871] [23.642] [9.717]** [19.134] [11.844] [39.326] [34.533] [45.066] [40.942]
HH relatedness (1) 19.593 35.007 31.204 -0.703 -11.179 9.496 22.168 39.826 -11.677
[12.286] [19.626]+ [16.362]
Number of generations -2.483 1.524 1.373 -5.126 -5.344
[3.268] [5.147] [5.009] [3.748] [3.758]
Age rank in HH (1=oldest) 0.66 3.017 2.978 -1.348 -1.629 -1.356 -3.202 -0.936 -3.164
[1.954] [3.108] [3.096] [2.746] [2.713] [2.807] [3.079] [2.827] [3.084]
Controls for day of week Y Y Y Y Y
Controls for tranche, stratum, 




Observations 10479 4890 4890 5589 5589
Households
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15
Joint test (P): 0.153 0.006 0.441
Efficiency test (P): 0.526 0.820 0.37
Equality test (P):
Exploitation test (P):
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(6)
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects - adjusted
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